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he picture Robert Whaples has painted is
certainly grim. Economic history is not
just neglected, but shunned—or worse yet,
despised—by most historians. Meanwhile, in eco-
nomics departments, where the majority of eco-
nomic historians now reside, the
field is marginalized and, in the long
run, doomed to extinction.
To make the picture even more
depressing, Whaples (being the good
economic historian that he is) backs
up his assertions with solid evidence.
One could easily add to it. To judge
by the titles of articles in main-
stream history journals (the American
Historical Review, the Journal of Amer-
ican History, the Journal of Modern His-
tory, Past and Present), interest in
economic history is vanishing.1 Dissertations in eco-
nomic history in history departments are rare.2 And
citations suggest that major works of economic his-
tory can pass unnoticed by the history profession
even when they address issues that once fascinated
many non-economic historians.3
My personal experience, if it is worth anything,
suggests much the same. Older historians I know
who were trained in the 1970s may not write eco-
nomic history, but they do seem willing to pay at-
tention to it. They also seem open to borrowing
from the social sciences and to the possibility of
generalization—in other words, to the notion that
what they have unearthed in the archives is not nec-
essarily a special case. Younger historians, by con-
trast, seem suspicious of most social sciences and
far more reluctant to generalize. Getting them to
read economic history is a much tougher sell. Be-
cause of its subjectivity and its assumptions about
evidence, much of the new cultural history may
even be incompatible with economic history and
other varieties of history that draw upon the social
sciences.4
Why then should historians even bother to pay
any attention at all to economic history if the field
is divorced from what goes on in history depart-
ments and apparently headed toward the grave even
in economics? There are several reasons why they
should. Despite what Whaples says, economic his-
tory is a vibrant field. It can help historians enor-
mously, no matter what they work on or what their
political opinions happen to be. It can be particu-
larly useful for the many historians
who still admit the possibility of at
least occasional generalization and
who are as hard-nosed about evi-
dence as any economist.
Although economic history may
be on the margins of economics as a
discipline, it is secure and thriving at
Berkeley, Caltech, Harvard, Michigan,
Northwestern, Stanford, UC Davis,
UC Irvine, UCLA, and Yale, and in
many other economics departments
as well. The All-UC Group in Eco-
nomic History, which supports economic history at
the University of California, recently had its fund-
ing renewed despite the state’s dire financial crisis
and competition from scores of other programs in
the humanities and social, biological, and physical
sciences. And outside the United States, economic
history is prospering in Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, and other parts of Europe, and especially in
Asia and Latin America. Some 1,300 economic his-
torians attended the 2009 World Economic History
Congress in Utrecht. That is hardly the mark of a
nomic ideas, a guide to policy, and a school for so-
cial scientists. It is no accident that some of  the best
minds in economics value it highly. What a pity, then,
that the rest have drifted away.”
This drifting away has continued and brings us
full circle. Economic historians recently had another
brief  moment in the sun when the world wanted
their insights into the nature of  financial panics and
instability. For many of  the economic historians I
spoke with at the 2009 EHA meeting, the fleeting
attention and the crisis itself  were sources of  deep
disappointment over the state of  the discipline. Sev-
eral argued that a root cause of  the economic crisis
was a failure of  the key decision makers to know
their history. If  those old economic history require-
ments hadn’t been banished, if  the leading economic
theorists, policy makers, and financial executives had
learned their economic history, they would have
known how bubbles arise, would have spotted this
one, understood its causes, and acted accordingly to
avert the disaster years before it unfolded. Why did
policy makers searching for solutions to the mess
not understand that half  the economic history pro-
fession has concluded that “taken as a whole gov-
ernment policies of  the New Deal served to
lengthen and deepen the Great Depression”?10 Why
do outsiders think that the only valuable kind of  eco-
nomic history concerns financial and macroeco-
nomic issues? Imagine a world in which the policy
makers, opinion shapers, and thinkers of  the world
took seriously what economic history has to say
about health care reform, educational reform, cli-
mate policy. What a pity. 
Robert Whaples is chair of  the department of  econom-
ics at Wake Forest University. He is editor with Di-
anne Betts of  Historical Perspectives on the
American Economy: Selected Readings (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995). 
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Because of  its subjectivity and its assump-
tions about evidence, much of  the new cul-
tural history may even be incompatible with
economic history and other varieties of  his-
tory that draw upon the social sciences.
field that is ready for hospice care.
Economic history may therefore be safe from
extinction, but the typical member of a history de-
partment may still wonder why he or she should
bother to pay any attention to it. “Why,” he or she
might ask, “should we read something that is likely
boring, badly written, and divorced from anything
we do?” My response: I defy anyone to read a sin-
gle page of Joel Mokyr, Deirdre McCloskey, Greg
Clark, or Jan de Vries and maintain that economic
history is poorly written. Their
books and articles have a force
and verve reminiscent of past
masters of historical prose,
such as J.H. Hexter, and while
these four scholars may be ex-
ceptional, most economic his-
torians write clearly and
carefully marshall evidence to
support their arguments. How
much non-economic history
today meets even that minimal
standard?
Nor is economic history
just tables and graphs—far
from it. It can be packed with
vivid anecdotes and pictures,
as in Alan Olmstead and Paul
Rhode’s Creating Abundance: Bi-
ological Innovation and American
Agricultural Development. It takes
on big issues such as educa-
tion, inequality, welfare, and
government spending—see,
for instance, Peter Lindert’s Growing Public: Social
Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Cen-
tury or Claudia Goldin’s and Lawrence Katz’s The
Race between Education and Technology. Some works of
economic history—Greg Clark’s A Farewell to Alms:
A Brief Economic History of the World and Robert
Allen’s The British Industrial Revolution in Global Per-
spective—attract huge numbers of nonacademic
readers.
Economic history is not just about markets and
businesses: it concerns politics, education, inequal-
ity, technological innovation, marriage and family,
and, more generally, the incentives that affect all
sorts of behavior in societies large and small. Its
breadth reflects the range of economics itself,
which today aspires to be a theory of virtually all
human conduct. That may smack of hubris, but
economics is a powerful tool for understanding
what humans do, both today and in the past. When
I and two coauthors, for instance, were tracing the
evolution of credit markets in Paris across three
centuries of social and political change, a simple
economic model gave us powerful insights into
what was happening. The model highlighted the sig-
nificance of the city’s notaries (officials who drew
up and preserved legal documents) in arranging
loans. Although social historians had long empha-
sized the notaries’ social and legal importance, we
unearthed the crux of the notaries’ financial role—
how the information they gathered in the course of
their business helped lenders find creditworthy bor-
rowers. Our model made this clear, and it matched
the quantitative evidence we collected in notarial
records. It also pointed us to new sources. Indeed,
if the model was correct, the three of us decided
one afternoon, then anyone who was wealthy and
left an abundant correspondence would in all like-
lihood have written his notary about managing his
portfolio. We immediately thought of Voltaire, ran
into the stacks of the UCLA library, and found ex-
actly what the model predicted.5
Economics can also help us discern patterns in
the wide variety of past behavior and thus make
comparisons across time and space. That ability to
make comparisons is particularly important for
global history. As a historian who knows early mod-
ern Europe well, it may be difficult for me to make
comparisons with, say, Ming China, but with a bit
of economics, I at least have a way to analyze eco-
nomic, social, and political differences. Global his-
tory has therefore attracted a great deal of attention
from economic historians, and they have been
drawn in particular into the debate over the “the
great divergence.” Launched by Ken Pomeranz’s
The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of
the Modern World Economy, the debate seeks to deter-
mine when and why Europe ended up getting rich
while advanced societies in Asia—China in partic-
ular—fell behind. For Pomeranz (whose Ph.D. is in
history, it is worth pointing out), coal and access to
colonial goods such as cotton ultimately gave Eu-
rope the edge, but it did not forge ahead of the
richest parts of China until the 19th century, when
political and ecological disasters added to China’s
handicaps. More recent research, however, raises
doubts about this chronology and suggests that
northwestern Europe may have been wealthier than
the rest of the world well before 1800.6 If further
research upholds this claim, then how do we ex-
plain this gap between early modern European and
Chinese incomes? One possibility—but far from
the only one—is to blame the incessant warfare that
plagued Europe in the late medieval and early mod-
ern periods. A simple economic model devised by
economist Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and the historian
R. Bin Wong suggests that warfare pushed more
manufacturing into the walled cities of Europe. As
a consequence, Europe had less cottage industry
than China and more urban industry. European
urban industry facilitated technological change and,
ultimately, industrialization.7
The debates over the great divergence show
that fruitful intellectual inter-
change between historians and
economists is certainly feasible
and can reward scholars in both
departments. With all the inter-
est in global history and other
comparative topics, the time
may in fact be ripe for a return
to economic history. And if
that is not reason enough, then
our recent financial crisis
should remind everyone of the
importance of economic his-
tory.
Perhaps there are even
signs of reawakened interest in
the subject among historians
who are not themselves eco-
nomic historians. A noteworthy
recent history of the Glorious
Revolution invokes economic
change to help explain the
causes and consequences of
the events of 1688.8 It might be
well worth your while to give economic history an-
other chance. Look at the works I have mentioned,
and if you find them interesting, consider walking
across campus and talking to your local economic
historian or attending an economic history seminar.
In the long run, that will benefit both you and the
economists.
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agree with every word of  Robert Whaples’s
elegant and well-grounded essay.1 Whaples
doesn’t say things until he has the goods—
and as he says, we people from the economic side
tend to think of  the goods as numbers. It’s very
true, as he also says, that our numerical habits
have repelled the history-historians, especially
since they have in turn drifted further into non-
quantitative studies of  race, class, and gender (it
is amusing that the young economic historian
Whaples quotes gets the holy trinity slightly
wrong, substituting “ethnicity,” a very old histor-
ical interest, for “class,” a reasonably new one; it
is less amusing that historians believe they can ad-
equately study race, class, and gender without ever
using numbers, beyond pages 1, 2, 3). 
But it’s also true, as is shown by the fierce and
ignorant quotations he reports from other econ-
omists and economic historians, that quantitative
social scientists don’t get the point of  the human-
ities. “Whenever I read historians,” said a young
economic historian to Whaples, “my response is:
How can you say that without a number? Do you
have a number?” Many social scientists, and especially
those trained as economists, believe adamantly that,
as Lord Kelvin put it in 1883, “when you cannot ex-
press it in numbers, your knowledge is of  a meager
and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of
knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts
advanced to the state of  Science.” The young econo-
mists nowadays believe this so fervently that rather
than deviating ever from their faith they insist on col-
lecting sometimes quite meaningless numbers (such
as what is known as “statistical significance,” or what
they are pleased to call “calibrations” of  a hypothet-
ical model unbelievable on its face). The economist
Frank Knight of  the University of  Iowa and then of
Chicago in the 1930s was standing outside the latter
institution’s Social Science Building, on which is in-
scribed a version of  Kelvin’s dictum. Looking up at
the inscription he remarked to his companion, “Yes,
and when you can measure your knowledge is of  a
meager and unsatisfactory kind!” 
It is worth remembering that Kelvin was as fool-
ishly arrogant about his physics as many modern
economists are about their numbers and models: he
said for example that “there is nothing new to be dis-
covered in physics now. All that remains is more and
more precise measurement.” On the very eve of  the
discovery of  radiation he calculated that Darwin
must be wrong because the sun could not be old
enough to have burned that long from merely chem-
ical reactions. The economists who laugh at the idea
that something might be learned from the past are of
the same faith that we are already in possession of
the Truth and need not engage in intellectual trade
with anyone differently endowed. Said one of  Whap-
les’s faithful, “Why read historians? They do every-
thing backward. They discuss ‘supply’ and ‘demand’
without prices, and speak of  needs rather than
choices.” A just God will surely punish such sinners
for their pride. 
Agreeing with Whaples, I can only make here a
point beyond his purview. It is: that if  humanistically
inclined historians and numbers-and-math inclined
economists are going to work together on their proj-
ects of  discovering how society happens—as eco-
nomics and history themselves suggest they could
profitably do—there needs to come into exis-
tence a humanistic science of  economics. Notice that
the phrase does not give up the word “science.”
It adds to science the insights to be gained from
the humanities. We English speakers should go
back to using the word “science” not as “physi-
cal and biological inquiries” but in the old and
wide sense of  “serious and systematic inquiry.”
That is what it means in every language except
the English of  the past 150 years: thus in Dutch
wetenschap, as in kunstwetenschap (“art science,” a re-
cent English impossibility), in German Wis-
senschaft as in die Geisteswissenschaften (the
humanities, literally to a recent English ear a very
spooky sounding “spirit sciences”), or in French
science as in les sciences humaines (serious and system-
atic inquiries concerning the human condition,
such as studies of  literature or philosophy or an-
thropology, literally “the human sciences,” an-
other impossible contradiction in recent English),
or plain “science” in English before 1850 or so.
Thus Alexander Pope in 1711 in his poetical
“Essay on Criticism”: “While from the bounded
level of  our mind/Short views we take, nor see the
lengths behind:/But more advanced, behold with
strange surprise/New distant scenes of  endless sci-
ence rise!” He did not mean physics and chemistry.
John Stuart Mill used “science” in its older sense in
all his works. Confining the word to “physical and
biological science,” sense 5b in the Oxford English Dic-
tionary—an accident of  English academic politics in
the mid-19th century—has tempted recent speakers
of  English to labor at the pointless task of  demarcat-
ing one kind of  serious and systematic inquiry from
another. Above all, it has set the “scientists” and the
humanists at each other’s throats, to the loss of  sci-
ence.
I just finished a book, out in October 2010 from
the University of  Chicago Press, called Bourgeois Dig-
nity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World. It
shows in detail why the materialist and anti-human-
ist version of  economics, from Marx’s exploitation
to Douglass North’s institutional incentives, cannot
explain what one of  Whaples’s interviewees prop-
erly calls “the miracle of  modern economic devel-
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Lord Kelvin, from Andrew Gray, Lord Kelvin: An Account of His
Scientific Life and Work (J.M. Dent and Company, 1908).
